What challenges will Algerian President Tebboune face in his second term?

It is often said that the true test of presidential elections is not the outcome so much as having a high enough voter turnout to legitimise the political process.

On September 7, 2024, Algeria’s incumbent president, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, was unsurprisingly re-elected for a second five-year presidential term with a whopping 94.65 percent of the vote.

However, the provisional data from the National Independent Authority for Elections (ANIE) indicated that just 23 percent of the population voted for a candidate.

One week later, and amidst much confusion and suspicion, the Constitutional Court revised those figures and established that Tebboune had been elected with 84.3 percent of the vote and that voter turnout actually sat at 46 percent.

Despite the backing of Algeria’s leading political parties, the National Liberation Front (FLN) and National Democratic Rally (RND), Tebboune’s failure to generate widespread voter enthusiasm raises questions about his popular legitimacy, which may hamper his efforts to address domestic and foreign challenges during his next term.

Domestic challenges: Civic participation

That Algerians did not flood the polls is a reflection of the fact that, under Tebboune’s tenure, Algerian civil society has been completely hollowed out.

Between 2019 and 2024, numerous associations, media outlets, and human rights organisations were shuttered, and many Hirak activists – the driving force behind protests that ended former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s 20-year rule – were forced into exile to avoid prosecution.

Some activists remain in Algerian prisons for participating in protests or expressing their views on social media.

Currently, some 200 people are incarcerated, according to the International Federation for Human Rights.

Several political figures have called for their release, such as Youcef Aouchiche, leader of the opposition Socialist Forces Front (FFS) and a presidential candidate who vowed to make freeing prisoners of conscience his top priority if elected.

Many analysts posit that Tebboune should act to ease these tight controls now that he has secured another term.

“President Tebboune must absolutely work on a new approach to governance,” said Hasni Abidi, director of the Study and Research Centre for the Arab and Mediterranean World (CERMAM).

“We know that freedom movements, social movements and revolts are also security issues and that he is not the only decision-maker in those situations, but it is a matter of stability … to have a civil society with which to share certain tasks,” Abidi said.

Increasing civil liberties could also raise the spirits of young people under 30, who constitute two-thirds of the 44.3 million total Algerians, according to the figures published by the National Office of Statistics in 2020. Young people significantly participated in the Hirak protests.

Algeria is currently facing a wave of youth emigration, often via “harga” (irregular migration) to Europe.

Aside from economic factors, the lack of civil liberties and a feeling of unease regarding the future are among the main reasons for the phenomenon, Raouf Farrah, senior analyst at the Global Initiative, told the Algerian news outlet Liberte in 2021.

Citizens join an anti-government protest in Algiers on March 5, 2021, as thousands demonstrated in cities across Algeria, confirming Hirak’s remobilisation after the second anniversary of the uprising on February 22 [Ryad Kramdi/AFP]

“There are several causes for harga, but the common denominator is a feeling of general despair… vis-a-vis the situation of the country, the state and society,” Farrah said. “That comes from a degradation of the quality of life and the rule of law, which is reflected in the reluctance of the regime in power to make any real change.”

Domestic challenges: Living conditions

To convince Algeria’s youth to stay, Tebboune’s government must enhance living conditions in a post-COVID-19 economic landscape characterised by high inflation, declining purchasing power and an unemployment rate of more than 10 percent, according to the International Monetary Fund.

His administration has continued subsidies on basic goods and introduced unemployment benefits for young people aged 19 to 40 in February 2022, with an initial monthly amount of 13,000 dinars ($98) that was raised to 15,000 dinars ($113) in January 2023.

Approximately two million people have already benefitted from the programme.

During his campaign, Tebboune pledged to diversify the economy, create 450,000 jobs, and double public sector salaries, relying heavily on oil and gas revenues bolstered by the war in Ukraine.

“The crisis in Ukraine allowed Algeria to gain a market share in Europe, supplying natural gas. Its share increased from 12 percent during 2020-2021 to 19 percent in 2023,” explained economics expert Abderrahmane Mebtoul.

“[State-owned oil company] Sonatrach feeds the entire Algerian economy. It enables financial growth, bolsters foreign exchange reserves and reinforces domestic spending, where, in 2023, social spending amounted to 5 trillion dinars [$37bn].

“Therefore, the domestic objectives of the next president will depend on several variables, among which are the evolution of oil and gas prices and exportable quantities since domestic consumption increases in parallel with Algerian demography,” Mebtoul said.

Algeria’s domestic consumption is slated to increase, as its population is expected to grow to 51 million by 2030.

Foreign challenges

Regional or domestic, the challenges ahead for President Tebboune are numerous.

He has spearheaded much of a recent diplomatic renaissance for Algeria, according to Riccardo Fabiani, project director for North Africa at the International Crisis Group.

Algeria had years of diplomatic absence when former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was gravely ill – a symptom of a hierarchical diplomatic chain of command he maintained – and Tebboune worked to reverse that.

“His focus has been on a handful of regional crises where Algeria has tried to play a leading role: Palestine, Western Sahara, the Sahel, Libya,” Fabiani explained.

Abdelhamid Siyam, a professor of Political Science and Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University, agrees that Algeria’s status has risen regionally since Tebboune’s election in 2019.

“Over the last three years, Algeria was elected to the UN Security Council and the Human Rights Council. It hosted the Arab Reunification Summit … [it] brought together the Palestinian factions that signed the Algiers Declaration for National Unity … and supported the budget of the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA [the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees],” Siyam said.

Despite the enthusiasm and the relative success, Tebboune’s foreign policy has also seen its fair share of setbacks, particularly in the Sahel and in Western Sahara.

A woman votes at a polling station during the presidential election in Algiers, on September 7, 2024 [Ramzi Boudina/Reuters]

In Mali, Colonel Assimi Goita, who came to power in a coup in 2020, ended 2015’s Algiers Accords, which Algeria had mediated between the Malian state and the Tuareg-Arab independence rebel groups in Mali’s north along its shared border with Algeria.

The conflict is of particular importance to Algeria, which does not want an active combat zone in such proximity.

Mali’s authorities rescinded the pact in January 2024 and enlisted the Russian mercenary Wagner Group to assist in its conflict with the rebels, who are retreating north, ever closer to the shared border.

“The Sahel is likely to remain a thorn in the side for Algeria, which has lost a lot of its previous influence and prestige with the new military authorities, who seem to prefer Morocco’s transactional approach,” said Fabiani.

“Algeria is trying to rebuild its relations with Niger, which seems less hostile than Mali towards its neighbour. But with Mali, reconciliation could prove more difficult.”

On the other hand, Algeria’s relations with some of its European partners are still cold, with Spain and France both publicly endorsing Morocco’s plan of autonomy for Western Sahara.

The disputed non-self-governing territory has been a thorny issue between Algeria and Morocco since Spain withdrew from it in 1975.

While Morocco views the territory as an integral part of its country, the Algerian government is staunchly anti-colonial and views what it deems as Moroccan expansionism with suspicion, fearing that it could extend to other parts of the region.

Ultimately, Tebboune’s ability to calm tensions in the region, coupled with his ability to address internal apathy and discontent, will determine the success of his second and final term in office.