Turkiye’s road ahead in a post-Assad Syria

As the situation in Syria remains complex and fragile, Turkiye’s role in shaping the country’s future has gained increasing attention.

From 2011, when the Syrian uprisings began, to the eventual fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, Turkiye has been at the forefront of military, diplomatic, and humanitarian efforts to manage the instability along its southern border.

With the fall of al-Assad as well as the absence of regime backers Iran and Russia, Turkiye faces a new chapter in its Syria strategy, requiring a recalculation of its goals and concerns.

The unity of Syria

Ankara has voiced its support for Syria’s new leadership, with high-level visits from figures such as National Intelligence Organization Director Ibrahim Kalin and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who received a warm welcome from the commander-in-chief of the new administration, Ahmed al-Sharaa.

The Turkish government says Turkiye’s political stability is paramount, but it must be accompanied by Syria’s territorial integrity.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told the parliamentary group of his Justice and Development, or AK Party, on December 25: “Syria’s security and peace might be secondary for others.

“We … cannot have such a luxury with a country with which we have a 910km-long border.”

Turkiye has emphasised the need for a political transition led by all Syrians, with Fidan saying in Damascus on December 22 that the priority in Syria is “to achieve national reconciliation, to ensure economic development, and to create conditions that will enable Syrians who have been separated from their country for years to return to their homeland”.

The creation of a stable, unified Syria would also align with Ankara’s attempt to ease domestic pressure over the large number of Syrian refugees in the country.

The opposition has accused the government of mismanaging the refugee issue and blames refugees for Turkiye’s economic hardships.

Xenophobic rhetoric by far-right segments has fuelled an anti-refugee sentiment across the country, which has at times led to violence against Syrians.

Rebuilding Syria

Turkiye, one of the largest economies in the region with a strong construction sector, is aware of its capacity when it comes to rebuilding Syria, which has been destroyed over a decade in terms of economy, infrastructure, and services.

Turkiye’s transport, energy and natural resources ministries have already announced plans to fix roads, airports, energy and electricity infrastructure in Syria.

However, Syria will need more financial support and donors for development and humanitarian aid. So Turkiye will seek to establish regional coordination, particularly with partners in the Gulf.

Destroyed buildings facing the Aleppo Citadel [Ali Haj Suleiman/Al Jazeera]

Ankara has strong ties with Qatar and has normalised relations with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, giving it strong trade and financial ties with all three that it can combine with its political and diplomatic influence in Syria.

In addition to achieving Syrian reconstruction, cooperation with the Gulf could bring Turkiye and the Arab world closer.

It has mended fences with all Arab countries, except Syria under al-Assad, with steadfast support for the Palestinian cause that is expected to remain a focal point of its regional policy.

While Turkiye does not follow a sectarian agenda, Iran’s perceived sectarian agenda in the region, as well as its attempt to become a regional leader, has long created a sense of distrust and rivalry with Turkiye.

Both sides attempt to limit one another’s sphere of influence, particularly on security issues.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan meets Syria’s Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus on December 22, 2024 [Handout: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs via Reuters]

The YPG question

The presence of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), in Syria remains central to Turkiye’s security strategy as it considers the two groups organically linked and adhering to the same ethno-nationalist separatism.

The PKK has been battling the Turkish government for decades, a conflict that has killed more than 40,000 people. Turkiye has long considered it a “terrorist organisation” as has the United States and the European Union.

The YPG in Syria is a leading member of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), along with the PKK, of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), an umbrella organisation of PKK-affiliated groups in Syria, Iraq, Turkiye, and Iran.

As a result, the Turkish state is wary of the SDF despite it also including Syrian Arab groups, and this has created friction with the US.

Since 2011, the YPG has reportedly carried out many attacks in Turkiye by infiltrating from Syria. The Turkish government views the fall of the Assad regime as an opportunity to eliminate what it sees as its greatest security threat.

For now, Turkiye is coordinating with the new administration of Syria about the YPG and wants to give the new leadership a chance to solve the issue.

Ankara has called on the YPG to disarm and integrate into Syria, but it is not clear if it will do so.

So far, the YPG-led SDF has proposed integration into the “new Syria” with the condition of autonomy at the local level in northeastern Syria and establishing a demilitarised zone.

Turkish armed forces’ howitzers deployed across the Syrian town of Tal Abyad on October 10, 2019 [Mahmut Serdar Alakus/Anadolu via Getty Images]

In the past, Turkiye launched cross-border operations into Syria to target YPG fighters along its borders, and it may do so again if disarmament does not work.

The YPG has a backer in the US, which armed and trained the SDF to fight against the ISIL (ISIS) group in Syria.

How US President-elect Donald Trump’s Syria policy will unfold will have a direct effect on how Turkiye will move regarding the YPG.

If Turkiye launches a new operation, it will send boots on the ground, supported by air operations. Moreover, it may also utilise the Syrian National Army opposition forces – which it trains and supports – as part of the offensive in areas occupied by the YPG.

Forks in the road

Internally, Syria remains fragile and vulnerable to sectarian and ethnic tensions, given the absence of an institutionalised security instrument. Recent sectarian tensions and violence in cities like Latakia, Tartous, and the capital, Damascus, are clear examples. The possibility of instability is well calculated by Ankara and a military offensive on northeastern Syria may come sooner in what Turkiye will say is to avoid widespread tension within the country.

Another issue that will have profound implications for Turkiye’s Syria policy is whether the US continues to support the YPG as opposed to withdrawing its soldiers from Syria.

If the Trump administration insists on strengthening the YPG in northeastern Syria, the Ankara-Washington dialogue may be dented further on the Syria file and the seemingly strong leader-to-leader relations between Trump and Erdogan may suffer.

Ultimately, Turkiye’s firm position on the YPG may clash with Trump’s unpredictability and damage bilateral ties in areas beyond Syria, including trade, the defence industry, and investments.

Another critical risk for Turkiye is Israel’s growing encroachment into Syrian territory beyond the occupied Golan Heights, which Turkiye sees as a threat not only to Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity but also to Turkiye’s national security.

The expansion may turn into a confrontation as Ankara believes Israel would not stop expansion in Syria and may ultimately directly threaten Turkiye.

Erdogan has, on several occasions, said if Israel is not stopped, it will “eventually target Anatolia with its delusions of a promised land”.