Op-ed: It's time for U.S. to treat rare earth metals as instruments of geopolitical power. China already does

In April 2025, China imposed caller export controls connected 7 uncommon world elements and the imperishable magnets derived from them — materials that signifier the instauration of modern beingness and modern warfare. Fighter jets, missiles, electrical vehicles, drones, upwind turbines, and adjacent information centers trust connected high-performance magnets made from these captious minerals. By restricting their flow, Beijing did not conscionable flex its concern muscle, it revealed America's and the remainder of the world's unsafe vulnerability. China's latest actions amusement their readiness and quality to weaponize American and planetary dependence.

This is not a caller challenge. The United States has known for implicit 15 years that its captious mineral proviso chains were excessively concentrated, excessively fragile, and excessively exposed to Chinese leverage and control. And yet, crossed Democratic and Republican administrations, we person failed to respond with urgency oregon coherence. Now, the consequences of those failures person grabbed america by the cervix and are cascading crossed our commercialized and defence sectors.

Following the London talks, Washington and Beijing announced connected Friday a caller commercialized framework nether which China volition resume approving export licenses for uncommon earths implicit the adjacent six months. U.S. officials person publically extolled the breakthrough — but person offered fewer details astir what was fixed successful return. That leaves large questions unanswered: What were the U.S. trade-offs? How volition the woody beryllium enforced? And what happens erstwhile the six months are up?

Skepticism is high. Ford precocious halted accumulation astatine its Chicago works owed to a magnet shortage — underscoring that adjacent short-term proviso interruptions person existent consequences. Paper agreements are not proviso concatenation solutions. Without transparency, timely approvals, and semipermanent planning, this could easy go different diplomatic rhythm of 1 measurement forward, 2 steps back.

Even this constricted reprieve carries risks. Dozens of companies successful Europe and North America person described China's export licence process arsenic highly invasive — requiring firms to taxable elaborate accumulation data, end-use applications, installation images, lawsuit names, and transaction histories. Some applicants person been denied for not providing photographs oregon documentation of their extremity users.

Executives accidental the process amounts to "official accusation extraction."

While firms are advised not to stock delicate IP, omitting cardinal details tin mean indefinite delays. For companies successful defence proviso chains, the implications are alarming: invaluable commercialized quality could beryllium utilized to representation competitors, disrupt pricing, oregon beforehand Chinese substitutes.

This isn't conscionable licensing — it's competitory surveillance. And until the U.S. builds secure, autarkic capableness crossed the captious minerals proviso chain, it remains exposed to some disruption and information risk.

This vulnerability did not hap overnight. Many person been watching this slow-motion bid wreck for years. In 2010, China chopped disconnected uncommon world exports to Japan during a maritime dispute, a wide informing changeable the U.S. observed but brushed off. In 2014, the Obama medication won a WTO lawsuit against China's export restrictions but wrongly assumed that ineligible occurrence would deter further manipulation.

What Trump, Biden person done

The archetypal Trump medication identified uncommon earths arsenic captious but notably exempted them from 2018 China tariffs, possibly an unspoken acknowledgment of U.S. dependence. Biden took the astir structured attack to date: Executive Order 14017, the Critical Minerals Working Group, and backing from the IIJA and IRA. Strategic partnerships similar the Minerals Security Partnership emerged. But advancement was slow, hampered by permitting delays and uneven state commitments.

The 2nd Trump medication has returned with much assertive measures, invoking Section 232, activating the Defense Production Act, and proposing large backing boosts successful FY2026. A National Energy Dominance Council present coordinates efforts. Yet these measures, similar China's six-month reprieve, inactive autumn abbreviated of dislodging Beijing's grip. And crucially, the defence assemblage remains chopped off, with nary specified licensing model available.

The caller G7 acme successful Canada underscored the planetary stakes. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen directly accused China of "weaponizing" its control implicit cardinal materials similar uncommon earths, calling for a agreed G7 response. The result: a G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan. Though China was not mentioned by name, the subtext was unmistakable. The program commits G7 members to rise ESG and traceability standards for cardinal resources; mobilize superior for caller projects successful captious mineral mining and processing; and cooperate connected innovation successful recycling, substitution, and refining technologies.

Predictably, Beijing reacted with fury. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed the program arsenic "a pretext" for protectionism, claiming the G7 was instigating confrontation retired of fearfulness of losing marketplace share.

Brussels is present signaling that commercialized negotiations with Beijing are efficaciously stalled, truthful the likelihood of Chinese retaliation — peculiarly against the EU — are rising. If China doubles down, it risks pushing the EU, Japan, South Korea, and India much tightly into Washington's orbit — precisely what Beijing hopes to avoid.

China's ascendant presumption successful uncommon world mining

The earthy numbers are staggering. China accounts for astir 70% of planetary uncommon world mining but implicit 90% of refining capacity. It produces 92% of the world's neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets — utilized successful everything from submarines to Teslas. This dominance is nary accident. China subsidized processing, focused connected planetary acquisitions crossed the proviso chain, and scales up accumulation overmuch faster than the West tin o.k. and contented permits for a azygous mine.

U.S. sites similar MP Materials' Mountain Pass and Round Top stay incomplete without downstream processing. The DoD and DOE person offered grants, and the FY2026 Trump fund looks to grow U.S. mining capableness and unafraid entree to captious minerals. But each this remains dwarfed by China's caput commencement and longtime concern command-and-control of the sector.

China moved aboriginal and decisively into Africa and Latin America, partnering with governments successful the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bolivia, and Chile; investing successful ports, rails, and refining infrastructure. In contrast, U.S. efforts and engagement connected these sets of issues has been piecemeal and values-forward, prioritizing transparency and governance, important issues indeed, but delivering constricted momentum of the captious mineral issues. Even caller MOUs with Ukraine and the Democratic Republic of Congo remain, for now, symbolic, hindered by struggle and instability successful those countries.

The London talks and caller commercialized woody advancement bought time. But clip without a strategy is not fruitful. China's licensing authorities remains intact, its information demands unabated. The defence assemblage remains unopen out. Meanwhile, legislature threats to rescind cleanable vigor and concern argumentation backing could stall rare-earth projects conscionable arsenic they summation traction.

This is simply a decisive moment. China is betting that America's interior divisions — betwixt labor, industry, environmentalists, tribal nations, and governmental factions — volition forestall the benignant of unified, sustained effort needed to compete. They whitethorn beryllium right. The U.S. needs to proves them wrong.

Critical minerals are geopolitical power

The United States indispensable present dainty captious minerals not arsenic commodities, but arsenic instruments of geopolitical power. China already does. Escaping its grip volition necessitate much than excavation permits and short-term funding. It demands a coherent, semipermanent strategy to physique a implicit proviso concatenation that includes not lone home capabilities but besides reliable allies and partners. From mining and refining to magnet accumulation and recycling, each nexus indispensable beryllium strengthened done targeted investment, permitting reform, and strategical coordination.

A palmy and sustainable argumentation requires committedness from 1 presidency to the next. Nor tin the U.S. spend to prosecute allies and partners lone rhetorically. Countries similar the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chile, and Indonesia (among others) request sustained partnerships backed by financing, exertion transfer, and captious infrastructure investments, not conscionable our lectures connected governance.

The six-month export reprieve from China is not a solution — it is simply a accent test. It reveals whether the U.S. tin yet absorption and act, oregon whether it volition retreat again into complacency. Beijing is betting it volition beryllium the latter. Washington indispensable respond with urgency, unity, and a strategy adjacent to the standard of the challenge. There is inactive time, but not much.

—By Dewardric McNeal, Managing Director and Senior Policy Analyst astatine Longview Global, and a CNBC Contributor