Modi’s Kashmir statehood promise. Poll rhetoric or genuine outreach?

Srinagar, Indian-administered Kashmir ­– As Kashmir gears up for the last phase of local elections due on Tuesday, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has promised to restore the disputed territory’s “statehood” that was stripped five years ago by his Hindu nationalist government.

“We had promised in the parliament that Jammu and Kashmir [official name of Indian-administered Kashmir] will again be a state,” Modi said, addressing a rather dull crowd in Srinagar, the main city in the disputed Muslim-majority territory.

Only the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) “will fulfil this commitment”, he said without elaborating further.

Modi’s latest election pitch comes amid widespread anger in Kashmir at the BJP for scrapping the region’s limited autonomy and demoting it into a federally run territory in 2019.

The move is also aimed at blunting attacks from Kashmir-based parties, who have made the restoration of the special status and statehood their main poll agenda.

The ghost of New Delhi’s unilateral decision to scrap the region’s special status, aimed at safeguarding local culture and demography, still looms large over the poll campaigns.

Anti-India sentiment runs deep in the disputed Himalayan region, which has witnessed decades of armed rebellion. India has accused Pakistan of backing rebels – a charge denied by Islamabad. Both the South Asian neighbours claim Kashmir in full but have governed parts of it since their independence from Britain in 1947.

So, what will be the nature of the promised state? What powers will the newly elected assembly wield? And can Kashmir’s unionist political parties, technically, deliver on their poll promises?

How does India’s federal structure function? Where does Kashmir fit in?

Late Professor Kenneth Clinton Wheare, an Australian academic and expert on constitutions of the British Commonwealth, described India as a “quasi-federal” state.

“Almost devolutionary in character: a unitary state with subsidiary federal features rather than a federal state with subsidiary unitary features,” he observed, implying that while power is centred in New Delhi, states are allowed to govern and legislate in accordance with regional contexts.

The Indian constitution defines the country as a “Union of States”, and then breaks down the power-sharing, legislative structure into three lists: the Union List, including remits such as defence and currency that are exclusive to the parliament; the State List, including powers such as police and public health that can be drafted by the states; and the Concurrent List, including areas such as marriage, education, and forests, which can be legislated by both.

But Kashmir’s relationship with New Delhi has been unique and complex as it joined the Indian union in 1947 with a set of conditions, which were enshrined in Article 370.

Under the terms of the instrument of accession, Kashmir gave India the power to manage matters of foreign affairs, defence, and communications — and left New Delhi with limited legislative powers.

While successive governments in New Delhi gradually eroded those powers, Kashmir still flexed its separate constitution, flag, and freedom to make laws on permanent residency and property ownership, and reserve government-sponsored opportunities exclusively for the state’s subjects.

Indian security personnel stand guard as voters queue up to cast their ballots at a polling station during the first phase of assembly elections in Pulwama, south of Srinagar on September 18, 2024. [Tauseef Mustafa/AFP]

What happened to special status?

On August 5, 2019, the Modi government removed Article 370, fulfilling BJP’s decades-long promise to remove the special status, which it said was responsible for the region’s political crisis and separatism.

New Delhi also bifurcated the region into two federally governed territories: Jammu and Kashmir bordering Pakistan in the west, and Ladakh bordering China in the east.

On the same day, Amit Shah, India’s home minister and Modi’s confidante, informed the parliament that, unlike Ladakh, “statehood” will be restored to Jammu and Kashmir.

To prevent the outbreak of protests, authorities arrested thousands of Kashmiri leaders and activists and imposed a months-long communication blockade – a move denounced by the opposition and international rights observers.

The decision was also immediately challenged in India’s top court, which eventually upheld the move in December last year and called for the restoration of the same statehood as any other Indian state – with no separate autonomy rights – “at the earliest and as soon as possible”.

But just weeks before the region’s first assembly elections, the Modi government gave its handpicked administrator more powers, further shrinking the scope of the incoming legislature.

“For the last five years, all Kashmiris have seen is an arrogant bureaucracy and the important missing layers of a local government,” said Anuradha Bhasin, editor of Kashmir Times and author of A Dismantled State: The Untold Story of Kashmir after Article 370.

“New Delhi has suppressed this area that has a history of turmoil. It has worrying, ominous signs,” she told Al Jazeera.

Speaking at a poll rally in the Jammu region, Rahul Gandhi, leader of the opposition in parliament, took a dig at the local administration saying “non-locals are running Jammu and Kashmir”.

“Your democratic right was snatched. We have given priority to the demand for restoration of statehood,” he said, addressing the crowd. “If [the BJP] fails to restore statehood after the elections, we will put pressure on them to ensure it.”

What power will the elected government have in Kashmir?

Political observers and Kashmiri analysts see the elections as a referendum on the BJP’s controversial decision –– and reflect upon the unchartered duality of running a legislature subservient to the central government.

While Kashmir parties have tried to realign their politics along the calls for restoration of special autonomy and “dignity”, experts told Al Jazeera that the newly elected government will have to work at the mercy of the Lieutenant Governor (LG), a constitutional head appointed by New Delhi under the current setup.

Under the flipped framework after August 2019, the LG will sway more influence than the elected assembly and will retain control over issues of “public order and police”. The government will also be unable to introduce any financial bill without a nod from the LG, holding the assembly a virtual prisoner in fiscal matters.

The LG now wields control over the greater bureaucracy, the anticorruption bureau, appointment of the Advocate General and law officers, and is included in matters of prosecutions and sanctions.

“The elected assembly will be completely under the thumb of the Lieutenant Governor, with curtailed powers for the head of government without any appreciable autonomy for the state,” Siddiq Wahid, an academic and political expert, told Al Jazeera.

The events of August 2019, Wahid said, “stripped us completely naked (of) our enhanced autonomy, dismantled the state and left it without any democratic representation for six years”.

The promise of statehood by the BJP, he added, is merely an act of “handing over a cap”. “We can put on a cap on top of our heads, but it means nothing,” he said, adding that “the more immediate objective is to divest Delhi of the direct political control over the state.”

Even in a case where the BJP restores the statehood to Jammu and Kashmir, the scenario remains open to alterations that will be tailored to New Delhi’s needs, said Sheikh Showkat, a senior Kashmiri analyst.

What are the choices before the pro-India parties?

The pro-India Kashmir parties have accused the BJP of denying Kashmiris their democratic rights and promised to restore Article 370 and full statehood.

Showkat said he has observed a “huge revulsion and deepening trust deficit” post-August 2019 between Kashmiris and New Delhi. But despite the enthusiasm he has noticed among the cadres of regional political groups, Showkat said the upcoming government “will be nothing more than a sort of a metropolitan council”.

“It may deal with day-to-day administration and local issues but cannot go beyond that,” he said. “It will always be dependent upon the views and wishes of the LG.”

That is a reality that has not escaped the regional political powerhouses.

The last two elected chief ministers of Indian-administered Kashmir, Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti — who head the National Conference (NC) and People’s Democratic Party (PDP) respectively — initially denied participating in the polls citing curtailed powers.

But both Abdullah and Mufti have reversed their decision to boycott the polls amid fears that the BJP may benefit from their non-participation.

Shokwat, the analyst, said the Kashmiri parties are facing “two bad choices: participating in polls gives legitimacy to New Delhi but staying away could give the BJP an edge in the government”.

He also emphasised a resolution that the new assembly could pass on the reorganisation of the erstwhile state in August 2019 — a vital key missing, as required under the constitution.

“Whosoever comes to power,” Showkat added, the new government will “use the avenue to legitimise or delegitimise the August 2019 decision”.

Mehbooba Mufti, leader of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), greets supporters during a campaign rally in Jammu [Channi Anand/AP Photo]

Will the Kashmir status quo be returned?

The friction between the elected government and the LG is not new to India. In Delhi, the Arvind Kejriwal-led government has fought multiple court battles, protested in the streets, and campaigned for greater control over the legislature.

That also provides a view of the upcoming tussles in Indian-administered Kashmir, said Bhasin, the editor. “The way that the BJP keeps controls, I don’t see they have a very different vision of governance in Jammu and Kashmir.”

Even before the abrogation of Article 370, Kashmir’s first leader Sheikh Abdullah was arrested in 1953 for backing a UN-sponsored plebiscite in Kashmir. He was released after 11 years in prison and after ceding powers to New Delhi. Over the decades, rights guaranteed under Article 370 were hollowed out by nearly 47 presidential orders.

In August 2019, the BJP claimed it had put the last nail in the coffin.

But Bhasin painted a pessimistic political outlook as she pointed out the unprecedented crackdown on press freedom and human rights.

“The hands of the clock have never moved back. Whatever has been taken from the people, in terms of their autonomy or democratic rights, has never been given back. I doubt that would change in the near future,” she told Al Jazeera.