Al-Shabab in Somalia: Bullets and bombs can’t bury ideologies

In August, Somalia’s prime minister, Hamza Abdi Barre, held a town-hall meeting in the Somali capital Mogadishu to mark the two-year anniversary of the formation of his cabinet.

Naturally, one of the hot-button issues raised at the event was the offensive against al-Shabab, which was launched in the fall of 2022.

“Today, we are not just defending our cities; we are pushing back against al-Shabab in their own territories,” Abdi Barre declared, adding that some 215 villages and towns have been recaptured by government forces.

Indeed, the Somali government has made significant gains in its war on al-Shabab – but the divisive tactics it has used have not only undermined its war effort but also worsened instability in the country, perpetuating bloodshed rather than stemming it.

Arming clan militias was a mistake

The government offensive against al-Shabab was announced shortly after the group’s attack on a hotel in Mogadishu in August 2022 that left 21 people dead.

One of the strategies the government adopted was to arm tribal militias who would fight alongside the Somali army. In the beginning, these militias played a key role in the military campaign that drove al-Shabab out of large swaths of territory in the Hirshabelle and Galmudug states.

While the use and empowerment of tribal militiamen – also known as “macawisley” – was initially applauded by Somalia’s international partners due to the territorial gains made, it divided Somali society even more.

This is because the government armed and provided financial support specifically to militias from President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s clan and others close to him. This was not only short-sighted but detrimental to efforts to establish social cohesion in the country.

Somalis are a deeply divided society, with old grievances predating the civil war. Trust is non-existent between different segments of the population. By prioritising certain clans over others under the pretext of combatting al-Shabab, the president alienated many communities and turned neighbours, friends and countrymen against one another.

With al-Shabab pushed out of many areas in Somalia’s Galmudug and Hirshabelle states, clan-based violence saw an uptick. The newly armed tribal militias started terrorising the same civilian population that they were entrusted with liberating.

Settling old scores linked to territorial disputes and control over grazing land and water resources have become a common occurrence. Banditry is also wide-spread and illegal roadblocks where people are extorted in order to pass have become a common sight.

The government, having no monopoly on the use of force, is completely incapable of taming the militias it has empowered. As a result, instead of dealing with the threat of one armed group in the country – al-Shabab – Mogadishu is now facing threats from multiple armed groups, some of them hailing from clans at odds with the Somali president. In essence, the government is responsible for the worsening security situation in the country and the unraveling of the war effort.

Foreign militarisation helps al-Shabab

Arming tribal militias was not the only mistake the government made. As the joint Somali army and tribal militia war against al-Shabab raged, the Somali leadership made an unexpected announcement in February 2023: neighbouring countries would deploy more troops to help in the final push to defeat the armed group. Four months later, at a UNSC meeting, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reiterated the plan, calling it Operation Black Lion and declaring that troops from Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti would participate.

Although the operation has not come to fruition, the announcement itself did not go down well with the Somali public.

The problem is that all of these nations have had troops deployed in Somalia for more than a decade, causing much resentment among Somalis. In fact, one of the main reasons that al-Shabab has been waging an insurgency in Somalia is because it believes the country is “occupied” by foreign troops.

The group first emerged in response to Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006. Subsequently, the deployment of troops from other African states at the behest of Western policy makers only helped it gain popularity among Somalis. These sentiments still persist.

Promoting the idea of having foreign armies more embedded in Somalia under the pretext of combatting al-Shabab plays into the armed group’s hands. It undoubtedly increases the already significant number of Somalis who view al-Shabab as a legitimate force fighting against the foreign subjugation of the country.

Winning hearts and minds

As the government pursued divisive policies of arming tribal militias and inviting more foreign troops into Somalia, it failed to get various stakeholders onboard with the war effort. Instead of a nationwide effort to counter al-Shabab, the vast majority of states and clans were sidelined. As a result, there is now a clear lack of national consensus on the direction that the war should be taken and how it should be handled.

To make matters worse, in 2023, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud began pushing for amendments of the Somali constitution to expand his control over the executive branch. This infuriated various political stakeholders and the Somali population alike, diminishing even more the public support for the war. Earlier this year, the Somali parliament voted in favour of the controversial constitutional amendments and the president signed them.

Such divisive actions have only helped al-Shabab’s strategy of winning hearts and minds among Somalis, facilitating its recruitment of fighters and strengthening its support base. The group is reportedly able to collect between $100m and $150m in taxes, operate an independent judiciary, and provide security for civilians living under its rule.

In essence, al-Shabab has been able to create and maintain a parallel government in a de facto state within Somalia’s official borders. It is able to do so with the image of respectability, in contrast to the authorities in Mogadishu that are widely perceived as corrupt and dishonest.

Over the past year, al-Shabab has been able to regain large swaths of territory. On August 26, 2023, al-Shabab raided a military base in the town of Owsweyne, reportedly killing more than 100 soldiers. This was the deadliest attack on Somali troops since the current government’s war effort began. In its aftermath, demoralised troops abandoned several strategic towns.

Al-Shabab has also been able to continue with its attacks on Mogadishu. In March, it stormed an upscale hotel within walking distance of the presidential palace, and in August, it launched a huge attack on the city beach.

The current strategy of the government is clearly not working. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud must acknowledge his mistakes, reconcile society and open up genuine dialogue with all his opponents, including al-Shabab. This would not only strengthen his credibility as an elder statesman with Somalia’s best interest at heart, but, more importantly, save lives.

Somali society has been in a state of war for more than three decades. More bloodshed is the last thing it needs.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.