A new deterrence for Lebanon is needed to avoid a long war with Israel

Following the re-election of former US President Donald Trump, efforts to negotiate a ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel have seemingly gained momentum. On Monday, US special envoy Amos Hochstein and Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer met in Washington to discuss the matter.

In October, Hochstein traveled to Beirut, but his visit bore no fruit, as he made clear that for the US, “both sides simply committing to [United Nations Security Council Resolution] 1701 is not enough” and that there needs to be a new “formula that brings an end to this conflict once and for all”. Casting aside UN decisions appears to have become commonplace among US officials of late, with disastrous consequences.

In their latest offer, Israel and the US are demanding that Lebanon accept a new arrangement in which Israeli troops can engage in “active enforcement” of demilitarisation in southern Lebanon. In other words, Israel would have effective military control over Lebanese territory.

No sovereign nation – or non-state actor – would ever agree to such terms. Neither Lebanon nor Hezbollah would give up their military deterrence. Therefore, US and Israeli insistence on these new conditions will only prolong the war.

Building a new consensus around Resolution 1701 remains the only viable path towards peace.

The resolution brought to an end Israel’s last war with Lebanon in 2006, acting as a mechanism to stop the hostilities and outlining measures to clear the border area of armed group presence. Although there were issues with its full implementation – which both sides were aware would happen – it effectively put an end to the fighting.

Commitment to its implementation can stop hostilities this time as well. And Hezbollah must make the first move.

The grim prospect of a long war

On Sunday, Israel’s Defense Minister Israel Katz declared that after 40 days of intense fighting, Hezbollah has been defeated. “Now it is our job to continue to put pressure in order to bring about the fruits of that victory,” he reportedly said during an official ceremony.

Israel seems to be convinced that it can bring Hezbollah to capitulation by force. However, going for a military solution in Lebanon means war that will not be anything like the 2006 conflict.

Back then, Israel’s ground offensive faltered, and public support eroded as losses mounted. Today, Prime Minister Netanyahu has the Israeli public’s backing, buoyed by military successes that have eliminated Hezbollah’s leadership and disrupted its communications networks.

Despite these losses, Hezbollah is also better prepared, better equipped, and arguably more disciplined than in 2006. It’s little wonder that Israel has not managed to gain more than a few miles of ground in since its land incursions began and the daily rocket salvoes directed at northern and central Israel continue.

Barring some major change or diplomatic shift under the incoming Trump administration that would put pressure on Israel, all of this means that we are in for a very long war.

An essential deterrent

Hezbollah restarted hostilities with Israel in support of its ally Hamas and, up until recently, made a ceasefire with Israel contingent on a ceasefire in Gaza. The group knows that while many Lebanese understand its ongoing intervention, many are also dissatisfied, to say the least, with its actions over the past two decades.

By propping the Syrian regime in the 2010s, helping maintain the rule of the corrupt Lebanese elite when the economy collapsed in 2019, and blocking the investigation into the 2020 Beirut port blast, Hezbollah has made a lot of enemies at home and abroad and has had to rely almost completely on Iran for diplomatic leverage and military prowess.

Its refusal to integrate into a national defence strategy by maintaining its weapons outside of the command and control of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has also led to a colossal mismanagement of national security and left the country vulnerable to Israel’s far superior military.

The devastation Israel is wreaking across Lebanon is also a major cause for concern. The longer the huge displacement from the south and east of the country continues, the more social tensions and anger towards Hezbollah will grow.

At the same time, Hezbollah’s deterrent arsenal of missiles and fighters is Lebanon’s only real bargaining chip. Without Hezbollah, Israel’s Merkava tanks would almost certainly roll into Beirut and install a puppet regime, facing little resistance along the way.

The Lebanese calling for Hezbollah to give up its arms for peace are either living in a fantasy world or are just terrible negotiators.

That said, if Hezbollah wants to salvage any semblance of Lebanese unity, the onus is on it to come to the table with a political plan for the implementation of Resolution 1701. It also needs to prove it can work within a national framework, not just act as an Iranian proxy.

Given the distrust among its detractors, for these initiatives to work they would need to happen in phases. For starters, Hezbollah would need to explain how it will formally coordinate with the LAF to form a joint deterrent force, just like it did in 2017 when they fought together against ISIL (ISIS). In addition, Hezbollah will need to accept that the national army and government speak on its behalf and that it needs to take its place in such a configuration without the threat of arms or veto power over political decisions.

From there, the party will need to elaborate on Lebanon’s national defence strategy, which can’t rely solely on the woefully under-resourced LAF. That strategy needs Hezbollah’s arms – but with a clear roadmap for integration.

New deterrence framework

Any new defence strategy that leaves Lebanon without a deterrent against Israel’s war machine is bound to fail and reinforce the justification for Iran and Hezbollah to maintain a non-state deterrent. Talk of a new national security framework and support for the LAF at conferences like the one organised by France in late October remains irrelevant, as it comes without concrete security guarantees for Lebanon.

If French President Emmanuel Macron, or any other Western leader, were serious about supporting Lebanon, they would offer something more concrete than mere talk of an arms embargo on Israel. France could offer Rafale jets or air defence systems, for instance, which would allow the LAF to establish its own deterrence.

Of course, that would mean France overstepping the US in terms of material support to the LAF – something that is unlikely before, at the very least, a well-defined stance on Lebanon’s national defence is made by Hezbollah and Iran.

What is clear at this stage is that an international diplomatic solution is needed, but not one which discards the consensus reached in 2006. The West and the incoming Trump administration need to face the fact that without a return to Resolution 1701, security guarantees and a military deterrent for Lebanon, wars with Israel will continue.

Hezbollah and Iran also need to understand they cannot run a private army in Lebanon and get away with it without deadly consequences. Otherwise, everyone will find themselves back on the battlefield talking about yet another “new formula”.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.